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However, disbelief in the paranormal is a position in its own right and, for many, by no means a self-evident position.
An avowal of disbelief is, therefore, a social phenomenon that may involve some interesting discursive work.
This article examines the discourse of self-ascribed 'sceptics', and analyses how they warrant their expressed position when faced with an ostensibly paranormal event for which they cannot provide a 'normal' explanation.
We show how, for example, through the use of 'definitely/something' constructions, they appeal to an explanation that exists in principle, though the details are not available to them. Such devices can be seen as social and discursive forms of belief maintenance, in that they are designed to maintain
Introduction
For well over a century, psychologists have attempted to understand belief in psychic or paranormal phenomena (e.g. Carpenter, 1873; Jastrow, 1886) . In doing so, they have traditionally approached such beliefs as erroneous, and often the isn't so (Gilovich, 1991) and Why people believe weird things (Shermer, 1997) , and of various hypotheses that seek to explain 'belief rather than 'disbelief' (for example, the 'misattribution hypothesis', the 'cognitive deficit hypothesis', the 'social marginality hypothesis'). In short, psychologists have typically treated 'belief' rather than 'disbelief' as problematic, and sought to understand why people believe in the paranormal rather than why people do not.
Given the widespread scepticism among psychologists about the existence of paranormal phenomena, this asymmetry is hardly surprising, but as research in the sociology of scientific knowledge has shown, there is much to be learned from a symmetrical approach to matters of controversy such as the paranormal (e.g. Collins and Pinch, 1982; Pinch, 1979) . This article begins from the pos ition that 'disbelief' in relation to the paranormal (commonly referred to as 'scepticism') is itself worthy of study. After all, 'disbelief' is not the absence of belief, but a belief position in its own right. It may be a position that most psycho logists regard as normal, unproblematic, even self-evident, but beliefs in para normal phenomena have been widespread throughout history and in most cultures, and even in the UK today a majority of people reportedly believe in paranormal phenomena of some sort (Blackmore, 1997; Wiseman and Watt, 2006 actional context in which it is produced (e.g. Wooffitt, 1992 Wooffitt, , 2006 Wooffitt and Allistone, 2005) , there has been little consideration given to the rhetorical and constructive nature of avowals of belief relating to the paranormal (Lamont, 2007) . Instead, research on paranormal belief has relied almost exclusively upon the use of questionnaires, and such an approach is not without problems. In addition to the specific criticisms of paranormal belief questionnaires (e.g. Wiseman and Watt, 2006) , there are more fundamental issues such as the problem of constitution (Potter and Wethereil, 1987 categories (such as 'mind reading') rather than to specific events, and partici pants' responses may not reflect beliefs about similar 'objects of thought' (Lamont, 2007) . One way to provide specific events about which participants might ex press a view is to show them a pseudo-psychic demonstration, but so far as these have been used in experiments, they have been accompanied by questionnaires participants' talk included avowals of belief regarding the paranormal. Indeed, one participant reported that 'I don't believe in paranormal activity what soever' and, a few minutes later, that 'I don't have strong beliefs against it but I don't have strong beliefs for it'. Since both these expressions came from the same participant, within a few minutes of each other, they can hardly be taken as repre sentative of an ongoing internal position. By treating beliefs as positions that are not only expressed but also defended and warranted in social interaction, this paper seeks to identify how individuals 'maintain' such positions. In this sense, belief maintenance is being seen as a social, discursive process, one involving discursive work in order to uphold a social position (which may indeed cor relate with an internal cognitive position, but which is nevertheless primarily a social phenomenon) (see Lamont, 2007) . To this extent, the present article adopts the theoretical stance exemplified by discursive psychology (Edwards, 2006; Potter, 2003 Potter, , 2005 (Sacks, 1992) . In particular, the context explored here, in which participants are asked to account for poten tially paranormal events, is one in which self ascriptions of the 'sceptic' label can be seen to carry a responsibility to provide non-paranormal explanations for events that might otherwise be construed as paranormal. The interactional problem they face is how they are to justify a position in which they reject expected that the particular context would be one in which participants would talk in a 'sceptical' manner about the ostensibly paranormal events in the show.
However, the study was concerned not with whether they expressed a sceptical view but rather with how they engaged in 'sceptical' talk. entertainment, but the demonstrations were explicitly designed to be seen as potentially genuine. For example, in a 'psychokinesis' demonstration, which was the main topic of discussion in the extracts below, a die was examined and openly dropped into a glass (by members of the audience) to show that it produced different numbers. The audience was then asked to concentrate on a number (say six), and a member of the audience was asked to drop the die into the glass. The result was a six.
This was repeated successfully with another number. On the third trial, how ever, the number was wrong. This failure was deliberate, and based on a well known theory in mentalism (the area of performance magic that specializes in the simulation of psychic feats) that perfect predictions are less likely to be viewed as genuine than predictions that are slightly off (Lamont and Wiseman, 1999) .
The failure on the third trial is also discussed below. , 2008) . The particular analytic processes employed here reflect the broadly conversation-analytic approach adopted by discursive psychology. However, it is clear that the interactional context in which the data to be dis cussed arose was not one of everyday discourse. Instead, it was an artificially created focus group setting in which participants responded to issues pre sented to them by a researcher who was herself identified with the perform ance that was the focus of discussions. The potential difficulties of applying this particular form of analysis to focus group data have been well identified by Puchta and Potter (2004 pant avow the belief that what they had seen was paranormal, while most ex plicitly stated that they thought they were the result of trickery. While this may not seem surprising, given that the events took place in a theatre as part of a piece of entertainment, it is worth noting that informal feedback, and written reviews of the show, included expressions not only of uncertainty about but also belief in the paranormal nature of some of the demonstrations. That they were the result of trickery therefore, was by no means self-evident. Second, par ticipants nevertheless oriented to a lack of explanation for what they had seen as problematic. in all the groups oriented to explanation as a topic of significance prior to being asked, and engaged in ongoing discursive work relating to possible explan ations throughout the discussions.
Subsequent analysis therefore focused upon how participants were able to warrant an avowal of disbelief (in the paranormal nature of the events that they saw) in the absence of an alternative 'normal' explanation. What is common across these justifications is that they deal with two related interactional difficul ties: first, the problem of accounting for a lack of belief in a paranormal cause; In the initial part of this extract, the speaker's introduction emphasizes a prior lack of interest in and knowledge about these events. The speaker's attendance is portrayed as having been unplanned (line 70) and contingent through the vague formulation of the prior events that preceded them: 'sort of followed on from a bit of a show' (line 71). Her knowledge of events is presented as minimal:
she states that she 'had absolutely no idea' what to expect (line 72), and refers to the paranormal as no more than a 'term' that she has heard (line 73). Although these preliminary descriptions present a version of the speaker as someone who is neither especially concerned with, nor knowledgeable about, the matters under discussion, at lines 73 to 75 a particular position is then adopted in relation to such matters when M categorizes herself as someone who is sceptical about the paranormal (line 74). Moreover, this categorization is presented not only as having current relevance, but also as having been the case prior u< the fact that M 'came into' the show (line 73).
However, her scepticism is presented in a particular way. It is described as a 'guess' (line 73), as a view that 'probably hasn't really' changed 'that much' However, the explanation proffered is also oriented towards the speaker's prior claims of lack of knowledge. First, the claim itself is produced in a way that marks its provisional status by incorporating terms such as 'I suppose', 'sort of thought', 'I guess probably' and 'somehow'. Second, the explanatory account incorporates a series of avowals of not knowing that both establish limits on the speaker's own responsibility for offering such an account and display a lack of investment in providing such details (Edwards, 1995) . Third, the precise detail and cause-and-effect structure normatively associated with explanatory talk are treated in this instance as being practically unavailable to the speaker, although the potential availability of such details is implied through the claim that 'some one actually sort of set that up'. What this extract shows, then, is that the sceptical claim being offered is de signed in a specific way: it incorporates a particular sort of explanation that is offered in anticipation of potentially undermining counter-claims. Having intro duced 'the dice thing' as a feature of experience that is 'tricky' in relation to a sceptical claim, it then incorporates an explanation for the problematic event that forestalls such potential counter-claims. In this instance, the precise details of this explanation are treated as being known by someone, even though they are practically unavailable to the speaker in the current context. The function of this appeal to an explanation that is available in principle, if not in practice, is therefore to establish the speaker's sceptical claim as appropriately grounded, in a context within which the speaker is not herself in a position to supply these details.
It is important to remember that the local context in which these descriptions are produced is one in which M is responding to questions and prompts intro duced by the researcher who has been identified as associated with the show that of what went on as in some way problematic and as requiring further explan ation. Following the reformulation of the question at line 126, the answer pro vided describes the speaker's standpoint as one which is sceptical in nature: 'the fix is in' (line 128). It is noteworthy here that although this sceptical position is initially presented as a presumption, it is then upgraded, at lines 127 to 128, to a belief that is held by necessity. However, the use of an idiomatic expression ('the fix is in'), rather than a literal avowal of scepticism, is treated as humorous by the interviewer and speaker, and avoids a potential criticism that a more literal avowal might provoke. In this way, the initial dubiety indicated in the speaker's first response provides a local context in which the relatively strong sceptical claim can be raised, albeit one that is not necessarily to be taken entirely seriously.
At lines 130andl32, the speaker draws upon shared cultural knowledge that shows are the sort of event that may be repetitive in nature, in describing how the next show will involve the same numbers coming up when the die is dropped At the beginning of this extract, the researcher invites the participants to provide a description of what happened during the show when the dice were used. In his response, the first speaker presents a sceptical position whilst explicitly stating that he has no explanation for what happened. Indeed, the sceptical position is presented as relatively rigid ('I think I'd be sceptical whatever happened'[lines 133-4]), while the inability to explain is described as 'obvious'. Nevertheless, within this context he offers a partial vague explanation relating to the glass having been held by the performer. That the latter held the glass is described as a 'fact', though how that relates to an explanation is left as 'something'. The equivocal explanatory status of this 'fact' is given emphasis both by the vague terms in which it is set out and by the reformulation that D provides at line 132, not have an explanation, the sceptical position initially presented is not attri buted to the event being discussed.
As was the case in preceding examples, however, the speaker then orients to the possibility that his own lack of understanding might undermine a sceptical position by going on to link his sceptical position to explanatory talk. At lines 136 to 137, he describes the holding of the glass as directly contributing to his greater scepticism, and then links this to the possibility that the performer can control events. He also offers two further 'facts' ('that there (was) water in the glass', 'he had different dice') that might be linked to the performer's control. It is interesting to note at this point, though, that even this more developed ex planation is presented in a somewhat tentative way through the use of terms such as 'probably', 'some way' and 'maybe'.
At lines is that the provision of extra detail about the performer's control as 'facts ' (lines 131,137,139) allows the speakers to imply that the vaguely presented explan ation on offer has a solid epistemic basis. In this way, as was seen in the preced ing examples, the definite factual status of the explanatory details as described works to balance the vagueness of their explanatory function.
In summary, what we see from the extracts presented here is that when the participants present themselves as holding a sceptical position, they engage in a significant amount of discursive work in order to warrant such a position. The warrant on offer sets out a sceptical explanation for these events whose epistemic status is presented as certain or factually based, even though relevant explan atory detail is produced in a somewhat vague way by appealing to others' knowl edge or attributing events to the control of the performer. The functional consequence of setting out these particular claims in just this way is that the speaker is able to describe the events under discussion as a case where 'definitely something' was going on, despite the practical unavailability of appropriate explanatory details. In short, what these descriptions provide for the speakers is a means of offering an 'explanation' without actually explaining anything. The appeal to others' knowledge has been a recurrent theme in disputes over ostensibly psychic phenomena, and magicians have regularly claimed not only that they possess such specialist knowledge but also that this makes them better qualified than scientists to assess psychic claims (e.g. Houdini, 1924; Lamont, 2004; Randi, 1975) . By attributing control of events to the performer, of course, the implication is that the performer possesses such knowledge. However, as extract 3 shows, the attribution of control to the performer could be used as a warrant for scepticism in its own right, and this notion has also been central to discourse relating to psychic claimants since at least the 19th century. By def inition, the term 'medium' assumed that the performer was not responsible for Finally, it is perhaps worth remembering that, though informal feedback and newspaper reviews of the show reflected a wide range of views about whether or not the feats were paranormal, and yet participants in the study over whelmingly rejected this, this cannot be taken as evidence of the latter actually being 'sceptics'. There were several expressions of belief in other forms of para normal phenomena during the discussions by individuals who, in relation to the events of the show, had expressed a sceptical position about the paranormal.
Such variability serves as a reminder that expressions of belief in the paranormal cannot be taken as straightforward representations of internal positions about general categories. By adopting a discursive approach to this topic, on the other hand, it has been possible to examine expressions of (dis)belief in more detail, and to identify how such beliefs can be justified. Such discursive justifications may reflect cognitive processes, insofar as individuals no doubt engage in internal rhetorical argument when thinking through their beliefs on their own (see Billig, 1987) though, of course, such internal discourse is not directly accessible. A discursive approach, on the other hand, by examining the interactional pro cesses involved in maintaining a discursive position, can illustrate the social aspect of belief maintenance (Lamont, 2007 
